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LAWYERS' OBLIGATIONS TO THE COURTS
BYRON 0. HOUSE0
T is paper will concern itself largely with the duty of lawyers to
the courts. It is written from the viewpoint of a country lawyer
suddenly catapulted from almost thirty years of practice to his state's
court of last resort via eight months on the trial bench. These van-
tage points have afforded an opportunity to observe the lawyer's
duty to the courts in various perspectives. With due respect to the
learned scholars who have written on the subject, this small contribu-
tion is launched.
In stating generally the duty of the advocate, I believe the oft-
quoted words written in the case of The Queen v. O'Connell' more
than one hundred years ago are truly appropriate:
"[H]e is a representative, but not a delegate. He gives to
his client the benefit of his learning, his talents, and his judg-
ment; but all through he never forgets what he owes to himself
and to others. He will not knowingly misstate the law-he will
not willfully misstate the facts, though it be to gain the cause for
his client. He will ever bear in mind that if he be the Advocate
of an. individual, and retained and remunerated (often inade-
quately) for his valuable services, yet he has a prior and per-
petual retainer on behalf of truth and justice; and there is no
Crown or other license which in any case, or for any party or
purpose, can discharge him from that primary and paramount
retainer."
The Honorable Charles E. Clark has stated that the subject of
legal ethics is a paradox from both its simplicity and its difficulty.
As he puts it, "everybody knows-or at least thinks he knows-the dif-
ference between right and wrong, between honesty and dishonesty."2
If this be true, then what is the purpose of the Canons of Ethics,
one asks. Mr. Robert T. McCracken in discussing their purpose
stated:
"Much of the intendment of the Canons has to do with the
eternal verities, with the fundamentals of right or wrong conduct
* Justice of the Supreme Court of Illinois, Springfield, Illinois.
17 I. Law Rep. 261, 318 (1844).
2 Clark, The Lawyers Duties to the Courts, 7 U. FLA. L. Rnv. 404 (1954).
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of the members of an ancient and honorable profession. These
fundamentals have not changed in the past half century. Let
us hope that they never will. The Canons did not create them;
they only reflect them. For lawyers of experience and the right
instincts, no Canons are required. As a guide for the young,
and even, in rare instances, for those of mature years, they are
most useful."3
Indeed there would be few, if any, breaches of ethics if all law-
yers could develop an instinct for truth and justice under all circum-
stances. Let us look then at what the lawyer's duty to the courts is
and how we can aid in helping develop in the lawyer the instinct to
fi ll this duty.
When considering the eternal truths of our profession, and the
duty an attorney has to the courts, we think immediately of his duty
to maintain a respectful attitude toward them. And so it is that the
very first of the Canons of Professional Ethics deals with this ques-
tion.
The courts in a society such as ours have the function of admin-
istering justice. They theoretically never make a mistake in dispens-
ing ideal justice and for this reason the whole power of the state will
be put forth, if necessary, to carry out their judgments and decrees.
This abstraction that administers ideal justice demands respect, and
society commands that every citizen respect it. An abstraction cannot
however render decrees or judgments, and therefore, our society
places a man or men on the bench to represent it. The man should
be marked by gentleness and purity of character, acuteness and sup-
pleness of mind, and by his learning, his moderation, and his sympa-
thetic understanding of his time.4 But, alas, he is, nevertheless hu-
man and fallible, and for this reason is sometimes criticized as are all
men. Be this as it may, every citizen, and especially the lawyer, has
a duty to maintain a respectful attitude toward that which the judge
represents though not necessarily the judge as a man.
The distinction was stated many years ago in this manner:
"Fidelity to the court requires outward respect in words and
actions. The oath, as it has been said, undoubtedly looks to
3 McCracken, The Canons of Ethics: Some Observations on Reappraisal,
48 A.B.A.J. 1098, 1100 (1957).
4 So Judge Learned Hand described the ideal as embodied in Justice Car-
dozo. See a review of "The Nature of the Judicial Process', in Juiusp nuDENcm
iN AcnoN (1958).
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nothing like allegiance to the person of the judge; unless in those
cases where his person is so inseparable from his office, that an
insult to the one is an indignity to the other. In matters collater-
al to official duty, the judge is on a level with the members of the
bar, as he is with his fellow citizens; his title to distinction and
respect resting on no other foundation than his virtues and quali-
ties as a man."5
There is one over-powering reason, among others, why a re-
spectful attitude to the judge be especially impressed upon the
lawyer. The layman who only occasionally enters the courtroom as
a juror, witness or party looks to the lawyer, who is in constant at-
tendance on the courts, as his example. Disrespect by the lawyer
breeds disrespect by the layman.
Respect for the court does not mean that the lawyer before a
ruling is finally made or a decision finally rendered, is not entitled
to vigorously protest against that which he deems erroneous.
"In order that the decisions of the courts may give satisfac-
tion to the parties and at the same time command public respect
and acceptance, they must proceed upon full arguments on both
sides. For it has long been proved that the most effectual and
only practicable method of arriving at the rights of a dispute is
by critical debate in the presence of an impartial third party,
where every statement and argument on either side is submitted
to the keenest scrutiny and attack. Where every step of the way
to judgment has been tested and contested, the chance of error
in the ultimate decision is reduced to a minimum. The better
the case is presented on each side, and the keener and more
skillful the debate before him, the more likely is it that the judge
will reach a just and sound judgment. That is why it has been
said that a strong Bar makes a strong Bench."8
Thus, the lawyer should and must vigorously argue his case at
the proper time and in the proper place since he is an essential ele-
ment in the administration of justice, but he should do so with a
respectful attitude. This responsibility, in turn, carries with it a
corresponding duty. The duty of which I speak is covered by Canon
22 dealing with candor and fairness to the court. As Mr. Justice
Anglin stated it:
"it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of being ab-
solutely fair with the court Candor and frankness should char-
5 SEa~WWOOD, LEGAL ETincs 61 (1884).
6 The Ethics of Advocacy, in JumasP.RuDENcE In ACtiON 310.
3
House: Lawyers' Obligations to the Courts
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1958
LAWYERS' OBLIGATIONS TO THE COURTS
acterize the conduct of the barrister at every stage of his case.
The court has the right to rely upon him to assist it in ascertain-
ing the truth. Veritas est justitiae mater. He should be most
careful to state with strict accuracy the contents of a paper, the
evidence of a witness, the admissions or the argument of his op-
ponent. Knowingly to cite an overruled case, or to refer to a
repealed statute as still in force, would be unpardonable, and
counsel cannot be too cautious not to make such mistakes un-
wittingly." 7
All authorities are in agreement that the lawyer has a duty not
to mislead the court by misquoting or misciting, but they are not in
agreement as to whether he has failed in his duty to the court by
an act of omission. For example, let us suppose that an attorney has
discovered a case holding against him on the very point he is argu-
ing, but neither his opponent nor the court is aware of it. Does the
attorney have a duty to bring the case to the court's attention al-
though it may prove fatal to his client's cause which he may other-
wise win; or should we adhere to the theory that it is an adversary
proceeding to the point where the attorney should remain silent
knowing that the judge is likely to render a judgment contrary to the
law which is binding upon him?
An able lawyer who often appears in our court handles the prob-
lem in this manner: he immediately draws the court's attention to the
adverse precedent, come what may, and does his best to differenti-
ate it, or to persuade the court not to follow it Although this course
has not always proved successful to him in the immediate case his
over-all success is excellent and has gained for him the confidence of
the courts and the respect of his colleagues.
As Mr. Drinker points out, counsel's duty in this case turns on
the degree to which the old idea that litigation is a game between the
lawyers has been supplanted by the more modem view that the law-
yer is a minister of justice.8 I am of the opinion that the court is en-
titled to rely on a lawyer's not misleading it by any act of omission as
well as commission in dealing with relevant facts. There should be
no question about the attorney's duty in this respect. As to the law
applicable to the case, the question becomes more complicated. The
judge is presumed to know the law, and, in addition, the applicable
law, which, unlike a matter of fact, is not always capable of being
7 Anglin, Relations of Bench and Bar, 29 Cm. L.T. 7 (1909).
s Dpjixm, LEGAL ETmcs 76 (1953).
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precisely ascertained. While I do not espouse the idea that an at-
torney has a duty to argue his opponent's case, I lean to the modem
view that he has a duty to see that the court is familiarized with all
cases that are clearly relevant before it when proceeding to judg-
ment.9
It has often been said that delayed justice is tantamount to a
denial of justice. The truth of this statement is being impressed on
the public daily as cases pile up on court calendars and dockets fall
further and further behind. The answer often given to the com-
plaints of the public is that more judges are needed or that the ju-
dicial system should be remodeled. It is not within the scope of this
paper to discuss judicial reform, but it seems obvious that if all
lawyers adhered to their duty not to employ dilatory tactics, our
court dockets would be much less congested.
"The law offers innumerable opportunities and means for
delay, many of which it is not only the right but the duty of the
lawyer to employ for the benefit of his client; others where it is
not The point at which he should draw the line is
a question which each lawyer must decide for himself under the
admonition of Canon 29 to 'strive at all times to uphold the
honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to im-
prove not only the law but the administration of justice'.'o
While a lawyer has the right to vigorously present his case, he
should do so with reasonable brevity. Unnecessarily prolonging ex-
aination of witnesses, bickering over objections, and continuation
of argument after the point has been made is vexatious to the court,
adds to calendar congestion and indicates a lack of courtesy and con-
sideration to counsel waiting to be heard on cases further along on
the docket. Arguments, both before the trial court and on appeal,
should be to the point. When completed, they should not be "re-
hashed", otherwise they merely tend to confuse. Insistence upon
taking every second, and more, of time alloted often causes an argu-
ment to lose much of its persuasiveness."
Whether the lawyer is delaying the cause in the interest of jus-
tice or for his financial gain or for malice is a matter left largely to
9 See t.mmmcAN B AssociATioN, OPINoNs OF THE CobnmnTr oN
PROF.SSiONAL Eamcs Aim GmxvAucEs 588-89 (1957).10 DmxE, LEcAL Eraics 83.
11 See Canon 21.
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his own conscience, subject, of course, to normal supervision of the
court. The duty not to employ dilatory tactics, like many others, is
often unenforceable except through the lawyer's own conscience and
professional pride. Has it not been said, and proved throughout the
ages, that civilization is measured by the extent of obedience to the
unenforceable? The lawyer who is not obedient to the unenforce-
able rules of conduct tends to bring discredit upon himself and his
profession.
It should be noted that the bar and courts have taken steps by
statutes and court rules to thwart the innumerable opportunities and
means of delay. Many states by statute or rule require specific aver-
ments and admissions and provide for pretrial conferences, interrog-
atories and the like in an endeavor to curtail those lawyers bent on
battling out the pleadings and blocking the reaching of an issue.
The Illinois courts, with the able assistance and excellent co-
operation of the Illinois state and Chicago bar associations have been
making an intensive study of the problem of delay and consequent
calendar congestion. Reports of the committees on uniform circuit
court rules, state-wide court and jury room facilities, uniform jury
instructions and limitation of voir dire examination were recently
presented at the fifth annual Illinois judicial conference. The first
tangible result was the adoption of a rule'2 by the supreme court lim-
iting voir dire examination of jurors by attorneys with the view of
lessening the time consumed in empaneling juries. Other measures
to eliminate delays are receiving further study and some undoubt-
edly will be adopted. But rules alone will not close all avenues to
delay. In the final analysis it is up to the lawyers to recognize their
duty not to employ dilatory tactics, to the end that congestion be
eliminated or at least substantially reduced.
As noted earlier, an essential element in the administration of
justice is an impartial third party. This impartial third party may be
the judge or the judge and jury. It is the duty of the lawyer in the
furtherance of justice to conduct himself in such a manner that the
judge and jury will remain impartial.
Canon 3 deals with the personal relations between lawyers and
judges. It properly states that there should be no private communi-
12 Ilinois Supreme Court Rule 24-1, adopted September 17, 1958.
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cation or argument to the judge concerning the merits of a pending
case. Such conduct obviously strikes at the heart of the administra-
tion of justice, as we know it, for it does away with the adversary
proceeding and tends to make the judge a partial rather than an im-
partial third party. A few jurists advocate no contact between law-
yers and judges outside the courtroom. To ascribe something sinis-
ter in a friendship of lawyer and judge, particularly one of long
standing, is unfair to both. After all, judges are still lawyers, despite
their robes and, in my opinion, those who mingle with other lawyers
socially and through bar association and similar activities are richer
by the experience. A note of warning to the lawyer may be in order.
My own observations have indicated that a judge has an unconscious
tendency "to lean over backwards" when passing upon a contested
matter in which a close friend is one of the advocates. The lawyer
should not take this amiss since it is only a natural tendency. As to
conduct which tends to gain from a judge special personal consider-
ation or favor, the matter is again largely left to the conscience and
professional pride of the lawyer. It would seem that this duty has
been usually safely so left.
The relation between the lawyer and the juror is dealt with in
Canon 23, which provides that "all attempts to curry favor with juries
by fawning, flattery or pretended solicitude for their personal com-
fort are unprofessional." To further insure that the jury remain im-
partial it has long been considered entirely improper for an attorney
or his client to privately converse with the jurors both before and
during the trial. It has been said: "The wrong [conversing with a
juror] is aggravated when the taint of personal interest mingles with
it, as when committed by a party to the cause, but appears in the
worst form when it is the act of attorneys or counsel who are the
sworn officers of the court, whose duty it is to act as guardians of
the fountains of justice. ... "13
A duty, not specifically included in the Canons, but which should
nevertheless be adhered to, is that imposed upon the lawyer to be
adequately prepared. He owes this duty to his client as well as to
the court. The amount of preparation that a lawyer puts into a case
seems to be left solely to his conscience and professional pride since
I know of no disciplinary action ever taken against a lawyer for fail-
ure to be prepared. Ignorance in action is a dangerous thing, and
3- Sn&R.swooD, LEGAL ETmIcs 68-69.
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the lawyer who is inadequately prepared has not only failed in his
duty to the court but has failed his client.
In addition to the duties the lawyer has to the courts heretofore
discussed, there are many others such as his duty not to alter court
records or abuse legal process, and the like, which are obvious. But
those commented on serve to illustrate that the lawyer faces many
difficult problems of conduct. One might ask how it is possible for
the lawyer to conduct his practice properly when there are so many
difficulties. The Right Honorable Lord McMillan gave this answer
to the question: "The truth is that so settled are the traditions of
honour and fair dealing which the Bar observes and such is the at-
mosphere which long observance of these traditions has created, that
those who have absorbed these traditions and live in that atmosphere
acquire unconsciously a sense of what is due to their calling and are
scarcely aware of the code of honour which daily guides them, so
much has it become their second nature." 4
I am happy to say that the conduct of the vast majority of law-
yers is guided by that instinct or second nature for truth and justice.
There are those few, however, who by their conduct bring disrespect,
not only upon themselves, but upon the whole profession. The bar
and the courts have, through disciplinary proceedings and fear
thereof, prevailed upon some of these few to change their ways. At
times it is found necessary to deprive them of their privilege to
practice. These efforts undoubtedly will be continued. Needless
to say, however, even though the diseased fragment of the bar is
located and cured it leaves its scar.
While this article generally deals with the lawyer's duty to the
courts, much of what has been said applies with equal force to the
lawyer's duties to the public, his clients and other lawyers. So, in
presenting the views following, which look to an improvement in
the bar of the future, the improvement of the attitude of the lawyer
to the courts will be only incidental to the over-all betterment
By maldng a closer scrutiny of the character of future lawyers
and stepping up their ethical training, much good can be accom-
plished. To borrow a term from the jargon of the mechanic, we
should institute a thorough program of "preventive maintenance' to
complement the program of improvement of the present bar. The
14 The Ethics of Advocacy, in JuRisp=rDENcE iN AcmoN 828.
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 1 [1958], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol61/iss1/3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
elimination of those who are found to be unfit before they begin the
study of law and the inculcation of ethical principles in students
throughout their study of the law should considerably reduce the
necessibt for disciplinary action after admission.
About thirty percent of the states, notably Pennsylvania since
1800 and Ohio since 1900, require registration prior to or shortly af-
ter the beginning of law study, and most of them make a character
study at the time of registration and another after completion of law
study before admission. New York, New Jersey, Michigan, Cali-
fornia and a few other states require fingerprinting of applicants.
There is much to be said in favor of the prior registration and
character examination plan. Where study by a character and fitness
committee, or similar body, finds an applicant clearly unfit, much
time, money and effort would be saved by eliminating him before
his years of law study commence. In other instances where the ap-
plicant is a borderline case, an annual study could be made to deter-
mine the degree of his rehabilitation. In a survey report on the sub-
ject, Mr. John G. Jackson of the New York bar concluded:
"The most effective procedures require (1) registration
when the study of law is begun; (2) the appointment by the
registrar of a preceptor to guide, instruct, and advise him during
his student years; (3) some period of law clerkship (by analogy
to the internship of a medical student); (4) proof of good moral
character and fitness both when the applicant registers as a law
student and again when he applies to take the bar examination,
from sources as disinterested as possible, using, if necessary, the
services of the National Conference of Bar Examiners; (5) in-
vestigation when necessary by the Examining Committee or its
appointee; (6) a personal appearance by the applicant before
the Committee or a member; (7) a final review and approval of
the applicant's entire record by the Committee before he may
take the bar examinations." 15
The adoption of the foregoing procedures by all jurisdictions,
and the setting up of a central office to clear the exchange of informa-
tion between states, would undoubtedly go far toward the improve-
ment of the future bar. 16 Furthermore, it seems that fingerprinting
15 Jackson, Character Requirements for Admission to the Bar, 20 FoXI.
L. REv. 805 (1951).
16 For a thorough treatment of this subject see Sprecher and Weiss, Re-
port to the [Illinois] Character and Fitness Committee on Registration of Law
Students and Fingerprinting (1956, unpublished).
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would prove helpful. Applicants should not object since our armed
services and federal agencies and many private enterprises require
persons in whom great trust and confidence are to be reposed to sub-
mit to fingerprinting. Certainly trust and confidence of the highest
degree are extended when a man is licensed to practice law.
The next step in a preventive maintenance program lies with the
law schools. Years ago the student of the law, for the most part,
gained the sense of professional standards to which he should ad-
here from the attorney in whose office he worked as a clerk. For
better or for worse, the student emulated the conduct of the attorney
under whom he was studying. In time, the law schools were given
the sole responsibility for educating the candidate for the bar. This
responsibility, in turn, carries with it the responsibility of inculcating
in the student the duties and obligations which will devolve upon
him as a lawyer. The law student should be informed of the charac-
teristics of the ethical lawyer and urged to begin acquiring such
characteristics from the moment he is introduced to the study of law
in a concentrated effort to inculcate in him the professional standards
to which he should adhere.
The new law student upoA learning of the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics will normally assume that if he obeys all of the canons
he will automatically be an ethical lawyer. I believe that this stu-
dent is safe in assuming that this course will prevent him from being
the target of any disciplinary proceeding but it will not necessarily
make him an ethical lawyer. Thus, I believe that acquainting the stu-
dent with the canons is only a beginning since his knowledge of
ethical standards should be broader than this. The instruction
should encompass the history and traditions of the profession and
the responsibilities of the lawyer in his various relationships.
It is also my belief that ethics should not be taught as an iso-
lated course of instruction like torts or contracts, but should be
taught in every course every day. It would seem that teaching ethics
in this manner gives a better perspective and greater emphasis since
questions of ethics are involved in every phase of the legal process.
Each professor should teach ethics every day as a part of every
course. In the course of constitutional law, for example, the student
will learn of the rights our constitutions afford a person accused of
a crime. If the professor, while teaching on this phase of the course,
10
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has instilled in his students a high regard for these rights, those who
may later be prosecutiig attorneys, will be less likely to infringe
the constitutional rights of the accused.
The lawyer has the Canons of Professional Ethics to consult be-
fore he acts. However, one who has not developed the second na-
ture for truth and justice tries too often to come within the letter of
the canons and does not come within their spirit and, consequently,
the purpose of the canons as set out in their preamble is for naught.
The language of Mr. Drinker on this question is most appropriate:
"... [A] man is not an ethical lawyer merely because he
obeys the Canons of Professional Ethics and the Ten Command-
ments and refrains from doing things for which he can be dis-
ciplined by a court or censured by an ethics committee. He is
an ethical lawyer only when his conduct goes beyond the dic-
tates of such rules. The Preamble to the Canons of Ethics states
that a lawyer must behave so that he will never be ashamed of
himself and so that what he does will commend itself to the
best people. He is thus commanded to do something more than
merely adhere to the Canons and the Ten Commandments."17
Much could be said on the subject of the courts' duties to the
lawyers but that is not within the scope of this article. I need only
say that we judges owe the reciprocal duty of respect, restraint,
tolerance and understanding toward the lawyer and his problems.
17 Drinker, The Ethical Lawyer, 7 U. FLA. L. REv. 375 (1954).
11
House: Lawyers' Obligations to the Courts
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1958
